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Article 
 COMPARATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE TORTS 
Robert F. Blomquist* 
Climate change torts are in their collective infancy.  Yet, there have been a 
few climate change tort actions launched, largely in the United States, against 
major carbon emitters.  Comparative tort law in countries around the world 
present interesting possibilities for future climate change tort actions seeking 
money damages and injunctive relief in coming years. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With breathtaking speed, “[o]ver the course of the last few years, 
climate change litigation has been transformed from a creative lawyering 
strategy to a major force in transnational regulatory governance of 
greenhouse gas emissions.”1  Climate change litigation is, in large part, a 
multi-pronged attempt by governments and non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”), to politically pressure industrial greenhouse 
gas emitters and enablers. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  I am grateful for the 
opportunity to have served as a panel chair for a conference on Litigating Climate Change 
held in February, 2011, at the Valparaiso University School of Law; many of the insights 
from that conference inspired this Article.  For articles presented at the conference, see 
Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air:  Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal 
Climate Change Regulation:  Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447 (2012); 
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, & Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools 
for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 (2012). 
1 William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview:  The Exigencies That Drive Potential 
Causes of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, 
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). 
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One recent commentator emphasized “the socio-legal role that 
climate change litigation plays” in constituting “a formal part of the 
regulatory process” as well as serving as an “expressive,” or “social 
norm creating” force.2  In particular, “[t]he adjudication provides a 
mechanism for dialogue and awareness . . . in a regulatory environment 
in which policies have not caught up with the problem.  At least as 
important, it creates diagonal interactions through which different levels 
and branches of regulators interact and grapple with what is needed.”3 
Climate change litigation encompasses subnational,4 national,5 and 
supranational6 case studies.7  Yet, from the perspective of tort law—as 
distinct from regulatory/administrative law,8 land use law,9 human 
                                                 
2 Hari M. Osofsky, Conclusion:  Adjudicating Climate Change Across Scales, in 
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, 
supra note 1, at 380, 383. 
3 Id. at 383 (footnote omitted). 
4 See, e.g., Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Climate Change Policy:  A Case 
Study of the Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 31; Mary 
Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 99. 
5 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 129; Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from 
Climate Change:  The Case Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 173. 
6 See, e.g., William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under 
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 314; Hari M. Osofsky, The 
Inuit Petition as a Bridge?  Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, in 
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, 
supra note 1, at 272 [hereinafter The Inuit Petition as a Bridge?  Beyond Dialectics of Climate 
Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights]; Erica J. Thorson, The World Heritage Convention and 
Climate Change:  The Case for a Climate-Change Mitigation Strategy Beyond the Kyoto Protocol, in 
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, 
supra note 1, at 255. 
7 Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?  Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory 
Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L. L. 585, 587 (2009) (“[T]he nature of climate change regulation 
necessitates multiscalar legal approaches—that is, ones which simultaneously engage more 
than one level of governance” because “[c]limate change is an individual, local, state, 
national, regional, and international problem” and “carbon is so deeply embedded in the 
global economy and its impacts manifest in specific ways in different places [that] 
emissions and impacts occur at multiple levels simultaneously.”). 
8 Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, Litigating Climate Change at the Coal Mine, in ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 48 
(discussing assorted Australian cases involving judicial orders requiring governmental 
agencies to examine the environmental impacts of greenhouse gases directly produced by 
coal mines and the future environmental impacts of burning coal). 
9 Cf. Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons:  
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, 
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rights law,10 and international law11—the theory and practice of pleading 
and proving a civil wrong caused by one or more defendants’ “climate 
change” conduct, sufficient to trigger entitlement to money damages or 
injunctive relief, or both, is seriously problematic at present.  Given the 
creativity and persistence of tort lawyers, however, it is likely that within 
the next several decades of the twenty-first century, in the United States 
as well as other countries, climate change torts will be recognized in 
individual cases that apply traditional tort causes of actions and evolving 
new tort causes of action.  In such cases, tort plaintiffs will likely recover 
money damages and equitable relief for their harms. 
The remainder of this Article is organized into two principal parts.  
In Part II, climate change tort developments in the United States will be 
discussed.  In Part III, a broad-brush comparative climate change tort 
perspective is sketched out by looking at recent developments in other 
countries.  A brief sketch of potential future scenarios and strategies of 
various climate change torts is considered in the Conclusion. 
II.  AMERICAN CLIMATE TORT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
As noted by David A. Grossman:  “Tort-based climate change 
litigation strikes many people as a strange idea at first.  Basic tort 
principles, however, combined with . . . scientific [evidence] . . . may 
provide a basis for liability claims against major corporate emitters for 
some of climate change’s effects.”12  Expanding on an earlier article that 
he wrote,13 Grossman provided an update, as of 2009, to American “tort 
law [principles] to hold companies emitting substantial amounts of 
                                                                                                             
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 72–73 (discussing the New 
Zealand Environment Court’s reversal of a local land use decision regarding the location of 
a small wind farm based on the positive national benefits of renewable energy outweighing 
the negative local effects). 
10 Cf. The Inuit Petition as a Bridge?  Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 6 (discussing a petition filed with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the Inuit people in the United States and 
Canada alleging that U.S. climate change policy violated their human rights). 
11 Cf. Andrew Strauss, Climate Change Litigation:  Opening the Door to the International 
Court of Justice, in  ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 334, 336–50 (formulating a strategy for 
litigating climate change disputes before the International Court of Justice). 
12 David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 193, 228 [hereinafter 
Tort-Based Climate Litigation]. 
13 David A. Grossman, Warming Up To a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003). 
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greenhouse gases liable for at least some of the harms caused by climate 
change.”14 
Grossman offers a number of illuminating observations about 
traditional American tort law and climate change.  First, from an 
overarching perspective, “because of the uneven nature and distribution 
of the effects of climate change . . . [t]his . . . raises the question of 
whether we should continue to ask the victims of climate change to bear 
these costs or transfer them [via tort law] to those who have most 
substantially contributed to creating the harm.”15  Second, “[p]ublic 
nuisance seems to be the strongest of the climate tort claims” because of 
the tort’s “focus on ‘unreasonable injury,’”16 the use of “public nuisance 
suits for decades to address pollution,”17 and since “[t]he application of 
nuisance law to the problem of climate change does not appear to be that 
novel an extension.”18  Third, “[p]roducts liability is another tort theory 
potentially applicable to climate change, although it seems to be a 
significantly weaker claim than public nuisance, which may be why no 
plaintiffs have filed climate change products liability suits to date.”19  
According to Grossman’s analysis: 
All things considered, . . . climate change plaintiffs’ 
strongest products liability claim [among warning 
                                                 
14 Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 193. 
15 Id. at 194.  He properly notes that “[a]llocation of the costs of harms is . . . [a] central 
tort concern.”  Id. (citing Eduardo M. Penalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts?  Applying Tort 
Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 569 (1998)). 
16 Id. at 195, 228. 
17 Id. at 195 (footnote omitted). 
18 Id. (footnote omitted).  Grossman highlights three recent public nuisance climate cases 
that have not yet reached the merits:  Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
(revealing that eight states, New York City, and three land trusts separately sued electric 
power companies that owned and operated fossil-fuel-fired power plants in twenty states 
seeking abatement of ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of global warming and 
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing, that the Clean Air Act and 
Environmental Protection Agency actions it authorizes displaced any federal common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from the power plants, and the 
availability of claims under state nuisance law would be left for consideration on remand), 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007), and Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (telling of a public nuisance claim against twenty-four oil, gas, and power 
companies seeking a declaratory judgment for damages and expenses as well as alleging 
civil conspiracy and concert of action).  Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 195—
196. 
19 Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 199 (“The basic elements of a products 
liability claim are:  (1) a product has a defect that makes it unreasonably dangerous; (2) this 
defect existed when the product left the defendant’s control; and (3) the defect proximately 
caused plaintiff’s injuries.”). 
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defects, design defects, and negligence] would appear to 
be a design defect suit.  However, recognition of 
manufacturers’ [such as automobile companies’] duties 
to climate change victims outside of their capacity as 
users or consumers of products that emit carbon dioxide 
is by no means certain, and potential defendants might 
be able to present strong “state of the art” defenses.  
While a products liability claim might be viable, 
therefore, these caveats suggest that it is a much weaker 
claim than public nuisance.20 
Fourth, speaking to potential jurisdictional hurdles in American 
climate change tort suits, Grossman concludes that, in light of recent U.S. 
Supreme Court standing jurisprudence, “the ability of plaintiffs in a 
climate tort case to establish standing . . . appears greatly enhanced.”21  
While displacement of federal common law nuisance claims is now the 
law after American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,22 Grossman concludes 
that federal preemption of state common law claims is unlikely, “at least 
until comprehensive [air pollution] regulations are in place (and perhaps 
[not] even then, if the regulations do not provide a remedy for 
harms) . . . so long as the emissions at issue in the state common law 
claims are not from motor vehicles.”23  Fifth, “[c]ausation in any climate 
change tort suit will be a complicated issue, as plaintiffs must show that 
their harms are traceable to defendants’ actions.”24  Generic and specific 
causation is problematic in climate change tort suits because “several 
factors are involved in producing shifts in climatic activity” and “[t]hese 
multiple causes and background levels of climatic effects make it 
difficult to show that [the] defendants’ contributions to anthropogenic 
climate change caused any particular incidence of a phenomenon.”25 
Focusing on the emerging common law duty of care in American 
climate change tort law—potentially applicable to a variety of tort causes 
of action (from the tort of negligence to product liability claims, from 
private nuisance to public nuisance suits)—Professors David Hunter and 
James Salzman provide a fascinating discussion of technological trends, 
foreseeable risks of harm, and reasonable mitigation measures that will 
                                                 
20 Id. at 206. 
21 Id. at 208. 
22 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011).  “The [Clean Air] Act itself . . . provides a means to seek 
limits on emissions of carbon dioxide . . . —the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking 
federal common law.  We see no room for a parallel track.”  Id. 
23 Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 213. 
24 Id. at 215. 
25 Id. at 217 (footnote omitted). 
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drive the next wave of climate change tort suits in their article, Negligence 
In the Air:  The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation.26  In considering 
potential “duty issues” of key potential climate tort defendants, they 
state: 
Car makers, oil companies, utilities, and others all have a 
duty to behave reasonably and avoid the unreasonable 
imposition of harm on others, of course, but what is the 
nature of this duty?  With respect to car companies, for 
example, is it unreasonable to produce cars that fully 
comply with existing regulatory requirements?  Have 
the impacts of auto emissions on the climate been so 
foreseeable in the past that a reasonable car company 
should have accounted for them in its design?  Or is it 
sufficient that car companies have been conforming to 
general industry norms and customs?  Indeed, given the 
consistently strong consumer demand for SUVs and cars 
with powerful engines, could a car company even have 
stayed in business if it produced only cars with low 
greenhouse gas emissions?  Looking to the future, when 
will foreseeability and design options have progressed 
enough that the duty of car companies should evolve?  
Does the consistent lobbying of some automobile 
companies against national fuel emissions 
standards . . . have relevance to their potential liability?  
Similar questions could be posed of fossil fuel 
producers, utilities, and other potential defendants.27 
Looking at the classic Judge Learned Hand negligence formula,28 
Hunter and Saltzman opine:  “The identifiable risks of climate change 
are becoming better understood, and most of them have become more 
likely with greater consequences than was thought even a decade ago.”29  
Moreover, “new technologies are lowering the costs of pollution control 
equipment, carbon storage, fuel switching, and renewable and other 
                                                 
26 David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air:  The Duty of Care in Climate 
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007). 
27 Id. at 1750–51. 
28 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s 
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of 
three variables:  (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting 
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”). 
29 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 26, at 1757. 
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energy alternatives.”30  Considering the potential “moral 
blameworthiness or unreasonableness of a defendant’s climate-changing 
activities,”31 the authors suggest a variety of relevant inquiries in climate 
change litigation: 
x Marketing a product (for example, an automobile) that is 
particularly inefficient. 
x Planning a large expansion of electricity generation from coal-
fired power plants without budgeting for any mitigation steps. 
x Taking preventive measures in foreign operations (where they 
may be subject to climate-related regulations) while continuing 
to operate without such measures [in the United States]. 
x Making public statements or issuing policies that appear climate 
friendly but do not reflect actual operations. 
x Reducing research and development budgets or slowing 
deployment of more carbon-efficient technologies or products. 
x Issuing or promoting misinformation about climate change that 
the company knows or reasonably should have known is false. 
x Withholding studies or information that would increase our 
understanding of climate change. 
x Destroying climate change related documents.32 
In closing this brief survey of important American tort law 
developments, it is instructive to note some innovative climate change 
tort theories and related liability theories suggested by other 
commentators.  Professor Mary Christina Wood has argued for 
“‘atmospheric trust litigation’” against all levels of American 
government to hold the government “accountable for reducing carbon 
emissions.”33  According to Wood, “[s]uch litigation rests on the premise 
that all governments hold natural resources in trust for their citizens and 
bear the fiduciary obligation to protect such resources for future 
generations.”34  Moreover, Aura Weinbaum contends that, as a gap-
filling climate change liability strategy to traditional tort causes of action, 
compensation based on restitution for unjust enrichment of emitters 
would be a fruitful idea.35 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1773. 
32 Id. at 1774 (footnotes omitted). 
33 Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE:  STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 99. 
34 Id. 
35 Aura Weinbaum, Unjust Enrichment:  An Alternative to Tort Law and Human Rights in 
the Climate Change Context?, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 429 (2011).  Recently, a seminal 
comparative law book was published:  CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY:  TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
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III.  COMPARATIVE CLIMATE TORT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Overview and Introduction 
In this Part, the preliminary discussion focuses on comparative 
environmental laws and policies that should be viewed as analogous to 
potential tort-based claims for environmentally-induced harms.  Then 
the commentary shifts to specific comparative tort-based climate change 
legal matters. 
As an initial comparative law observation relevant to global climate 
change litigation, it is interesting to note that more than half of the 195 
nations of the world—by one estimate 109 states36—“have constitutional 
environmental provisions of some kind,” while “no recently 
promulgated constitution omits these, and many older constitutions are 
being amended to include them.”37  According to Kathryn Kintzele’s 
analysis of national constitutional environmental provisions: 
Constitutions often carry a similar structure, regardless 
of the state:  an opening, or preambulatory, aspirational 
                                                                                                             
AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnee eds. 
2012) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY].  Under the rubric of “private law,” this 
book examines, among other climate liability topics, the following: 
Private law claims envisage one person, C, who alleges he/she has 
suffered damage from climate change, suing D, who is allegedly 
responsible in part for it, for compensation, or for an order to make D 
change his/her behaviour.  C might be a person who suffered in a 
heatwave [sic], or had his/her house flooded.  D might be an oil 
company or power generator.  The claim will be brought in “tort” or 
“delict.”  In common law systems a specific tort has to be alleged, and 
those most commonly discussed in this context are “nuisance” and 
“negligence.”  Establishment of this type of liability has been seen as a 
kind of holy grail by environmental campaigners and as an 
unacceptable disaster scenario by sectors of industry which might have 
to bear the cost.  The numbers of potential claimants and defendants in 
this type of action, and the scale of potential compensation, are all 
huge, and indeed the very wide scope of such claims is one policy 
factor against their being permitted.  No action of this type has yet 
succeeded.  Few have been brought, almost all in the United States of 
America. 
Jutta Brunnée, Silke Goldberg, Richard Lord QC & Lavanya Rajamani, Overview of Legal 
Issues Relevant to Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra, at 32–33 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted) (American English spelling).  For a detailed and timely analysis 
and quantification of U.S. climate change liability developments; see Michael B. Gerrard & 
Gregory E. Wannier, United States of America, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra, at 556–
604. 
36 TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 22, n.2 (2005) (citation 
omitted). 
37 Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). 
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statement, followed by numerated, operational clauses 
detailing the rights and duties of the government and 
the citizenry.  Many of the clear ethical statements found 
in constitutions are often preambulatory, but many of 
the operative clauses show ethical considerations, as 
well.38 
Kintzele identifies a variety of environmental constitutional 
provisions of foreign nations that have potential implications for climate 
change tort-based litigation.  Among the national environmental 
constitutional provisions extant are those of Ecuador,39 Cuba,40 France,41 
Bhutan,42 Montenegro,43 Iraq,44 and Kenya.45 
                                                 
38 Kathryn Kintzele, Keeping Nature Alive:  From Moral Motivations to Legal Implications, in 
GLOBALISATION AND ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY IN SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 
(Laura Westra, Klaus Bosselmann, & Colin Soskolne eds., 2011). 
39 “‘Nature has the right to an integral restoration.  This integral restoration is 
independent of the obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the 
people and the collectives that depend on the natural systems.’”  Id. at 234 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting República del Ecuador’s, Rights of Nature, art. 2 (2008)). 
40 “The [s]tate protects the environment and natural resources of the country.  It 
recognizes their close link with the sustainable economy and social development for 
making human life more sensible, and for ensuring survival, welfare and security of 
present and future generations.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting República de Cuba (1992)). 
41 “The French People, considering that natural resources and equilibriums have 
conditioned the emergence of mankind; the future and very existence of mankind are 
inextricably linked with its natural environment . . . .”  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Charte de l’Environnement, République Française (1958, amended 2007)).  Moreover:  
“When the occurrence of any damage, albeit unpredictable in the current state of scientific 
knowledge, may seriously and irreversibly harm the environment, public authorities shall, 
with due respect for the principle of precaution and the areas within their jurisdiction, 
ensure the implementation of procedures . . . .”  Id. (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Charte de l’Environnement, République Française, Art. 5 (1958, amended 
2007)). 
42 “Parliament may, in order to ensure sustainable use of natural resources, enact 
environmental legislation and implement environmental standards and instruments based 
on the precautionary principle, polluter pay principle, maintenance of intergenerational 
equity . . . .”  Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bhutan, art. 5, 
Environment 4 (2008)). 
43 “Montenegro is a civil, democratic, ecological state with social justice, based on the 
rule of law.”  Id. at 235 (footnote omitted) (quoting Montenegro, art. I (2007)). 
44 Iraq mandates a constitutional oath be taken by each member of the Council of 
Representatives:  “I swear by God Almighty to carry out my legal duties and 
responsibilities with devotion and integrity and preserve the independence and 
sovereignty of Iraq, and safeguard the interests of its people, and ensure the safety of its 
land, sky, water, wealth, and federal democratic system . . . .”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Article 50, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of 
the Republic of Iraq] of 2005). 
45 “The [s]tate shall . . . ensure that social and cultural values traditionally applied by the 
communities of Kenya for the sustainable management of the environment and natural 
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Beyond national environmental constitutional provisions, domestic 
courts in numerous foreign nations have found enforceable 
environmental rights emanating from national constitutions.  These 
judicial opinions, based on interpretation of their respective national 
constitutions, stem from cases in India,46 Columbia, and Nigeria.47  
Joining this trend is the 1993 Philippines Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Oposa v. Factoran, where the court opined: 
[T]he right to a balanced and healthful ecology belongs 
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns 
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation 
the advancement of which may even be said to predate 
all governments and constitutions. 
 
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be 
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist 
from the inception of humankind.  If they are now 
explicitly mentioned it is because of the well-founded 
fear of its framers that unless the right to a balanced and 
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state 
policies by the Constitution itself the day would not be 
too far when all else would be lost not only for the 
present generation, but also for those to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched 
earth incapable of sustaining life.48 
There are also non-constitutional foreign law principles that are 
analogous and relevant to potential tort-based climate change law.  
India’s substantive law, for example, “has a robust public trust doctrine 
that citizens there can draw upon to establish atmospheric trust 
                                                                                                             
resources are observed.”  Id. at 236 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Jamhuri ya Kenya, Republic of Kenya, chs. 8–87 (2001, amended 2008)). 
46 Sinden, supra note 5, at 186 (citing Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) A.I.R. 
1480 S.C. 717; Michael R. Anderson, Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 199, 215–16 (Alan E. Boyle & 
Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996)). 
47 Id. (citing Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas Tary, Human Rights and the 
Environment:  A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 382–87 
(2004)). 
48 Wood, supra note 4, at 101–02, n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Juan Antonio Oposa 
v. Fulgenico S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., 1993) (Phil.), excerpted in JAN G. LAITOS, 
SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARY C. WOOD & DAN H. COLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 
(2006)). 
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responsibility.”49  In a similar vein, Indian tort law, according to one 
authoritative account, has the potential of holding enterprises that cause 
environmental or health damages to an absolute liability standard, with 
no exceptions; if the enterprises are adjudicated as being engaged in 
hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.50  Furthermore, the India 
Supreme Court has held that, in hazardous substance tort actions, “the 
measure of compensation must be correlated to the magnitude and 
capacity of the enterprise, thereby challenging well-settled principles of 
tort law” and allowing a potential liability for climate change torts 
whereby “the larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater 
must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused 
on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or 
inherently dangerous activities.”51 
Climate change litigation in Europe has “differed from that of the 
[United States] mainly because of the diverse and less homogeneous 
framework that characterizes Europe.”52  Indeed, “[e]ach European state 
tends to tackle domestic issues, including those related to the 
environment, with a unique and cultural-specific approach, not only 
from a legal perspective, but also from political and cultural points of 
view.”53  Yet, the supranational political and legal structure of the 
European Union has created an Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”), 
which, in turn, has spawned “a considerable number of proceedings” 
before European supranational courts focusing on various aspect of 
Directive 2003/87/EC, establishing the ETS “allowances for the quantity 
of CO2 that can be emitted by a single Member state over a particular 
period” of time.54  The supranational European carbon market litigation 
                                                 
49 Id. at 124 (citing M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India)); Karnataka 
Indus. Areas Dev. Bd. v. Sri C. Kenchappa, A.I.R. 2006 S.C.W. 2546 (India); T.N. 
Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4256; Perumatty Grama 
Panchayat v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 K.L.T. 731 (India); Deepa Badrinarayana, The 
Emerging Constitutional Challenge of Climate Change:  India in Perspective, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 26 n.137 (2009)). 
50 See Els Reynaers & Krishnan Venkataraman, India, in ENVIRONMENT IN 26 
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 74, 79 (Carlos de Miguel Perales ed. 2008), 
http://www.smarteeconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/india-18.pdf. 
51 Id. at 78; see also, RICHARD DUNDAS ALEXANDER, INDIAN CASE-LAW ON TORTS (R.F. 
Rampinini, 3d ed. 1906); LEARNING FROM DISASTER:  RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 
(Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994). 
52 Luciano Butti, The Tortuous Road to Liability:  A Critical Survey on Climate Litigation in 
Europe and North America, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32, 34 (2011). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (citing JAN H. JANS & HANS H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 385–88 
(3d ed. 2008); A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme:  Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66 
(2007)). 
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to date can be “conceptually divided into the following three categories:  
challenges to the validity of the directive, infringement proceedings, and 
challenges to decisions of the European Commission on the National 
Allocation Plans designed by the Member states for re-allocating the 
allowances to national installations.”55  One Italian scholar has 
commented on these European carbon litigation trends by observing:  
“Evidently, little room is left for individual applications aimed at 
recovering [tort-based] damages suffered as a result of global warming, 
and therefore, linked to CO2 emissions.”56  Indeed, according to this 
view, compared to the potential tort-based trajectory of U.S. carbon 
litigation in the future, “[t]he influence of the resulting [European 
regulatory] jurisprudence thus ends up being considerably more limited, 
and the possibilities of evolution more scant.”57  Yet, another scholar, 
Giedré Kaminskaité-Salters, focusing on English law, has boldly 
articulated a possible tort-based legal approach to achieve legal redress 
in his book, Constructing a Private Climate Change Lawsuit Under English 
Law:  A Comparative Perspective.58 
B. Asia and Pacific National Laws59 
Australia—a commonwealth, consisting of “a federal State with 
three levels of government comprising a national government, the 
governments of six states and two territories, and local government”60—
“is one of the developed countries most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change.”61  Greatly influenced by English tort law, the tort of 
                                                 
55 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 GIEDRÉ KAMINSKAITÉ-SALTERS, CONSTRUCTING A PRIVATE CLIMATE CHANGE LAWSUIT 
UNDER ENGLISH LAW:  A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010). 
59 The regional headings and national law summaries that follow rely extensively on the 
approach taken by the various authors in the book, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 
35. 
60 Ross Abbs, Peter Cashman & Tim Stephens, Australia, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, 
supra note 35, at 67. 
61 Id. at 70.  In particular: 
As the driest inhabited continent on earth, with already high levels of 
climate variability, Australia can expect a range of severe impacts if 
there is no mitigation of global emissions.  Under a business-as-usual 
scenario it is expected that by 2100 drought will be increasingly 
frequent; there will be severe stress on urban water supplies; irrigated 
agricultural production in the Murray Darling Basin, Australia’s main 
“food bowl,” will have declined by more than [ninety] per cent [sic]; 
the Great Barrier Reef will effectively have been destroyed; and many 
coastal areas including the Kakadu wetlands will have been 
transformed by rising sea levels. 
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negligence under relevant Australian law, would be problematic 
because:  (1) plaintiffs would likely have difficulties establishing duty of 
due care; (2) there would be issues of foreseeability; (3) there is 
conservative precedent regarding legal policy reasons to recognize a 
duty; (4) proximate causation problems would surface; (5) there would 
be standard of care and breach of duty barriers stemming from multiple 
and diffuse sources of greenhouse gases and the social usefulness of 
carbon-intensive industrial and mining activities; (6) causation proof 
problems would erupt; and (7) there would be scope of liability 
limitations.62  Australian private and public nuisance “law is poorly 
adapted to dealing with the consequences of large-scale industrial 
activity, and has rarely ventured beyond cases involving close 
geographical propinquity.”63  So, “while the law of nuisance might have 
the potential to short-circuit some of the complications associated with 
the law of negligence, it has severe limitations and raises a number of 
doctrinal hurdles of its own.”64 
The People’s Republic of China (“PNC” / “China”) “is a united and 
multi-ethnic country, with a unitary system of government yet a multi-
tiered legal system.”65  China has suffered from “grave climate damage” 
in recent years.66  Broad national statutory principles of civil law, tort 
law, and environmental law could conceivably construe a climate tort 
under Chinese law.67  “Environmental torts encompass conduct or 
activities (industrial or from other anthropogenic sources) which cause 
harm or damage to personal, property or environmental rights and 
interests or to public property.”68  Interestingly, as a departure from 
common law tort principles, “[a]s the principle of causation presumption 
                                                                                                             
Id. (footnote omitted). 
62 Id. at 86–98. 
63 Id. at 98. 
64 Id. at 99. 
65 Deng Haifeng, China, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 112. 
66 Id. at 124.  The details are as follows: 
In 2009, [China] suffered from extremely high temperatures in summer 
and very low temperatures in winter, temperatures it had not 
witnessed for decades.  An extraordinarily severe drought occurred in 
2009–10 in southwest China, the most serious drought in recorded 
history.  In 2010, fourteen rounds of rainstorm [sic] continuously 
attacked south China and regions south of the Yangtze River . . . ; ten 
rounds of rainstorms continuously attacked north China and west 
China and temperatures were high beyond historical extremes in many 
places.  Cumulatively, these caused major casualties and economic loss 
to China. 
Id. at 124–25 (footnote omitted). 
67 Id. at 135. 
68 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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is applicable to environmental torts, the burden of proof is reversed, i.e., 
the party causing the injury shall bear the burden of proving that there is 
no causality between the act causing the injury and the harmful result.”69  
Moreover, “strict liability is applicable to environmental torts in China, 
which means that liability will be imposed on the person legally 
responsible for the loss or damage without a finding of fault being 
necessary.”70  Yet, because of the code-based stringency of Chinese 
environmental tort law, “[s]ince there is no provision in China for 
private law liability directly caused by climate change,” one observer 
contends that “GHG emissions will not give rise to tort liability.”71 
India is subject to national and state legislation, in addition to a 
panoply of subordinate administrative rules; moreover, as “a legacy of 
its colonial past,” it has a common law heritage that relies on judicial 
precedent.72  “India will soon be a significant contributor to climate 
change.  India is predicted by some estimates to become the third largest 
emitter by 2015. . . with the United States, European Union, China and 
Russia, to account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gases . . . .”73  
India faces a variety of serious climate risks in coming decades.74  “There 
have been no significant private law claims in India based on allegations 
of actual or anticipated damage from climate change.  However, should 
claimants be inclined to bring such claims, the two torts that offer 
promise are nuisance and negligence.”75  Premised on principles of 
English common law tort, similar barriers exist under Indian law as 
under Australian tort law76 in bringing a successful climate change tort.77 
                                                 
69 Id. at 136 (footnote omitted) (quoting Art. 66, Tort Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2009). 
70 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Art. 7, Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
2009). 
71 Id. at 137. 
72 Lavanya Rajamani & Shibani Ghosh, India, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 
35, at 139. 
73 Id. at 140–41 (footnotes omitted). 
74 According to one authoritative estimate: 
[T]he annual mean surface air temperature in India is likely to rise by 
1.7°C and 2.0°C in the 2030s; melting glaciers will increase flood risk 
and decrease water supply; sea level rise . . . will threaten coastal 
regions; monsoons, on which agriculture depends, will become more 
erratic and rain less plentiful; and incidence of malaria and other 
vector-borne diseases will increase, as will heat-related deaths and 
illnesses.  [Moreover], . . . by 2080–2100, there is a probability of [ten to 
forty] per cent loss in crop production, and before 2025 India is likely 
to reach a state of water stress. 
Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted). 
75 Id. at 164. 
76 See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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Indonesia is subject to “significant negative impact” from climate 
change risks.78  “Indonesia inherited its civil law system from the Dutch.  
In addition to written laws, other sources of Indonesian law are custom, 
case law, treaty and doctrine.”79  Two potential climate change theories 
of action exist under Indonesian legislation:  (1) an “[u]nlawful action”—
similar to the negligence concept of a breach of “reasonable care,” but 
also encompassing contravention of “public decency” and “principles of 
propriety/appropriateness,”80 and (2) “strict liability for actions that 
cause a ‘serious threat to the environment.’”81 
Japan’s legal system is a product of U.S. law that existed “during the 
period of the Allied occupation after the Second World War,” but “major 
[Japanese] codes, including the Civil code and the Criminal code, were 
modelled [sic] on the French and German codes and are still heavily 
influenced by the Civil law system.”82  Importantly, “[t]he earthquake on 
11 March 2011 and nuclear incident in Fukushima is [sic] likely to change 
national and governmental debate on future energy and climate policy” 
in Japan since the previous national GHG “[twenty-five] percent 
reduction target is premised on construction of fourteen new nuclear 
                                                                                                             
77 In addition to negligence and nuisance torts, an absolute liability tort exists under 
Indian law, stemming from a 1987 Supreme Court of India case.  Rajamani & Ghosh, supra 
note 72, at 166 (citing M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 S.C.C. 395).  The basis of this 
rule of absolute “liability is that a non-delegable duty is owed to the community to ensure 
that highest standards of safety are maintained” when enterprises are involved in 
“hazardous or inherently dangerous industrial activity and harm results on account of an 
accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity.”  Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
78 Mas Achmad Santosa, Josi Khatarina & Rifqi Sjarief Assegaf, Indonesia, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 178.  In particular: 
The combination of sea level rise and an increased occurrence of 
extreme weather . . . will cause higher intensity of erosion and 
abrasion.  In turn, it will further negatively affect the changes in the 
coastline that is already losing ground to higher sea level.  This 
negative impact is reflected in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta.  It is 
estimated that by 2100 Jakarta’s coastline will be reduced by [fifteen] 
km, thereby directly affecting the central business district.  The erosion 
also contributed to the loss of twenty-four Indonesian islands in two 
years (2005–07).  Extreme weather also causes a significant negative 
impact on the lives of the population that lives along the coastline.  
This population is often subject to maritime accidents and disasters 
caused by extreme weather, diseases, drought and flood. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
79 Id. at 181. 
80 Id. at 194. 
81 Id. at 195 (footnote omitted). 
82 Yukari Takamura, Japan, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 206. 
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plants, which might now be impractical with public opposition.”83  
Under a Japanese civil code provision first enacted in 1896, and still in 
effect, tort liability for intentional or negligent “violat[ion] [of] the rights 
of others,” triggers civil liability for compensation and injunctive relief.84  
Regarding negligence, “[s]ome [Japanese] lower courts dealing with 
pollution cases have passed judgments to the effect that when there is a 
threat to life and body, costs to avoid the damage should not be 
considered and [enterprises] should be obliged to cease operations.”85  
Strict liability, without fault, exists under Japanese law for “hazardous 
activities involving significant risks” to others.86  Some recent Japanese 
courts have liberalized factual causation burdens of victims by 
considering “epidemiologic evidence of factual causation between 
collective acts and the disease” and “award[ing] compensation tailored 
to the degree of probability,” thus allowing “discounted compensation 
providing that there is a substantial likelihood that claimants suffer from 
the [environmental] disease.”87  Interestingly, 
Injunctions have the potential [under Japanese tort law] 
to play a powerful role in climate protection:  [F]or 
instance, injunctions could result in the suspension or 
limitation of those GHG emitting activities of large 
emitters that are likely to cause climate change.  The 
difficulty lies in the need to show “unlawfulness”:  [I]f 
the activities in question are considered public in nature 
and/or if the damage in question is regarded as not 
significant, the [Japanese] courts would not order an 
injunction.  However, the courts have reconfirmed in 
several cases that where there is a high probability of 
damage to human health, even if the activities in 
question are of a public nature, injunctive relief should 
be provided.88 
                                                 
83 Id. at 210.  A Japanese government report predicts the following climate change 
impacts by 2050:  increased flood damage, drastic changes in rice production areas, and a 
doubling of heat stress deaths.  Id. at 215. 
84 Id. at 228 (quoting Civil Code, art. 709, 1986). 
85 Id. (footnote omitted). 
86 Id. at 229. 
87 Id. at 229–30 (footnote omitted). 
88 Id. at 232–33 (footnote omitted). 
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In sum, regarding “civil litigation, Japanese case law demonstrates a 
clear trend towards better environmental protection and more effective 
remedies for victims.”89 
C. Africa and Middle East National Laws 
While the full legal and political ramifications of Egypt’s “Arab 
Spring” revolution are still in flux,90 the broad framework of Egypt’s 
legal system is based on a civil code.91  “The sources of Egypt’s laws in 
order of priority are legislation, custom, the principles of Islamic Sharia, 
and equity.”92  Egypt’s judiciary is “slow and—with the exception of the 
higher courts—not very sophisticated.”93  Egypt’s climate change risks 
are in the following sectors:  “(1) agriculture and food security, (2) 
coastal zones, (3) aqua-culture and fisheries, (4) water resources, (5) 
human habitat and settlements, (6) tourism, and (7) human health.”94  
Tort liability in Egypt is based on the Civil Code with fault being the 
primary liability approach though there are also isolated areas of no-
fault, or strict, liability.95  Climate change private law tort claims for 
compensation, according to knowledgeable commentators, “will likely 
fail because of the requirements of actionable damage under Egyptian 
law.”96 
Israel’s “legal system has its roots in the British Mandate on 
Palestine.  The British, who ruled Palestine between 1917 and 1948, 
replaced many of the legal rules and institutions that were in place 
during the Ottoman era, infusing the legal system with significant 
common law elements.”97  Climate change risks for Israel include sea 
level risk and accompanying loss of land and structures along the 
Mediterranean Sea, desertification, soil erosion, salinization, surface 
runoff, water supply disruptions, vector-borne diseases, water-related 
illness, agricultural damage, and increased geo-political conflicts.98  No 
private law climate tort claims have yet to be filed; “[d]ue to the many 
                                                 
89 Id. at 240. 
90 See, e.g., Matt Bradley, Egypt Vote Puts Military Role in Play, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2012, at 
A8. 
91 Dalia Farouk & Lamiaa Youssef, Egypt, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, 
at 245. 
92 Id. (footnote omitted). 
93 Id.  “Seeking redress through the courts could therefore be a lengthy process with 
uncertain outcomes.”  Id. 
94 Id. at 249 (footnote omitted). 
95 Id. at 260. 
96 Id. at 271. 
97 Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Israel, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 272 
(footnote omitted). 
98 Id. at 277–78. 
Blomquist: Comparative Climate Change Torts
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
1070 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
difficulties a plaintiff would face in establishing liability, it is not 
anticipated that such a claim would be filed in the near future.”99  Future 
Israeli climate change torts—based on a codification of British common 
law torts—are likely to be predicated on “nuisance, breach of statutory 
duty and negligence.”100  Significantly, with the encouragement of the 
Supreme Court of Israel, negligence per se claims, based on statutory 
violations that cause harm, have proliferated, and climate change tort 
actions of the future may be based on this theory of liability.101  “The 
most likely defendants in Israel” of climate change torts include the 
following:  “(1) large producers of fossil fuels and gas (such as oil 
refineries and natural gas companies) and (2) heavy users of fossil fuels, 
fuel oil, coal and gas that cause GHG emissions, including large 
industrial and power generators.”102  Israeli tort law damages are 
liberally construed by the courts allowing for not only recovery of 
personal injuries and property damage but also for pure economic 
damages, such as lost profits or higher prices.103  A judicial trend of 
recognizing “statistical-based compensation” has made proving factual 
causation in difficult tort cases easier for Israeli plaintiffs.104 
In 1994, South Africa moved from a racially-based parliamentary 
sovereignty system “to a constitutional democracy underpinned by a 
progressive Bill of Rights,” which includes, among other provisions, “an 
environmental right.”105  “Notwithstanding these developments, the 
historic Roman-Dutch legal system, a mixed legal system reflecting 
aspects of both the European civil law and the English common law 
traditions, was retained.”106  Significant warming is predicted for the 
country by mid-century and, “[a]fter 2050, warming is projected to reach 
around 3–4°C along the coast, and 6–7°C in the interior.”107  According to 
one assessment:  “These types of temperature changes will place a 
massive strain on an already water-stressed nation currently dealing 
with problems of poverty and unemployment, poor service delivery and 
                                                 
99 Id. at 286. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 287–88. 
102 Id. at 289.  “Even through many other corporations and all individuals emit GHGs 
into the atmosphere, they are not potential defendants because the de minimis doctrine 
protects them from liability.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
103 Id. at 290–91. 
104 Id. at 292–93 (footnote omitted). 
105 Jan Glazewski & Debbie Collier, South Africa, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra 
note 35, at 320 (footnote omitted); cf. Patricia Kameri-Mbote & Collins Odote, Kenya, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 296, 312–15 (detailing a British-influenced tort 
law approach that is more traditional than that of South Africa). 
106 Glazewski & Collier, supra note 105, at 320 (footnote omitted). 
107 Id. at 319 (footnote omitted). 
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low levels of education.”108  Unlike the Anglo-American common law 
system of separately defined tort causes of action, in South Africa, the 
law of delict is the principal private law approach for seeking legal 
redress for injuries with “general principles or requirements that 
determine delictual liability.”109  The five essential requirements of a 
delict under South African law are:  “an act or omission; wrongfulness; 
fault; causation; and harm (loss).”110  Establishing legal causation “is 
likely to constitute a stumbling block in establishing liability for climate 
change” under South African law.111  “While there is to date no climate 
change” private law litigation extant, South African law is characterized 
by “the evolving nature of . . . private law principles which renders the 
law capable of adapting to new scenarios and threats of harm.”112 
D. Europe and Eurasia National Laws 
The European Union (“EU”) consists of twenty-seven member states 
and is governed by a regional treaty and a panoply of regional 
legislation and administrative directives.113  However, “neither the 
human rights provisions nor the EU rules on environmental policy 
allow” private litigants to bring actions regarding climate change 
liability “to the EU courts.”114  Private law litigants within the EU nation-
states must bring legal actions in domestic courts of a particular 
country.115 
Germany is governed by “a civil legal system” with laws 
promulgated by national, state, regional, and municipal legislative 
bodies, subject to judicial scrutiny and interpretation.116  Climate change 
environmental risks for Germany in the future entail more extreme 
precipitation and flooding, low water periods during dry summers, 
greater erosion, and potential ground and surface water 
contamination.117  There have been “no direct climate liability claims” 
under German private law to date.118  “Commentators from some law 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 333. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 341. 
112 Id. at 344. 
113 Ludwig Krämer, European Union Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 
351–52. 
114 Id. at 374–75. 
115 Id. 
116 Hans-Joachim Koch, Michael Lührs & Roda Verheyen, Germany, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 376–77. 
117 Id. at 386. 
118 Id. at 399. 
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firms have expressed views that are very sceptical [sic] as to the chances 
of success of such claims; and debate has now started . . . as to whether 
such claims would be covered by standard liability insurance.”119  
German law follows general principles of delict for wrongful conduct 
causing harm.120  With analogues to common law torts of negligence, 
nuisance, and strict liability,121 one set of commentators have predicted 
“that substantial potential [private law liability] lies in [German] cases 
where the owner of a coastal property claims costs for increasing coastal 
protection infrastructure from, for example, operators of large coal-fired 
power plants” and “claims for damages after a major storm flood.”122 
England, a constitutional monarchy without a written constitution, is 
a common law legal system with well-developed tort jurisprudence.123  
Climate change concerns for England, and the larger inclusive United 
Kingdom, entail “an increased risk of flooding, coastal erosion, damage 
to essential infrastructure due to intense rain events and increased levels 
of UV radiation.”124  As of early 2012, “[t]here have been no significant 
private law claims in England based directly on allegations of actual or 
anticipated damage from climate change.”125  A pithy projection of 
future English tort law actions for climate change damages asserts: 
Whether or not “direct” cases involving actions against 
emitters and similar defendants for damages for the 
effect of climate are successful, it is very likely that there 
will be much litigation against professionals, public 
bodies, utility companies and other categories of 
defendant, for damage allegedly caused or contributed 
to by climate change.  These cases typically [will] 
involve allegations that the defendant failed to factor in 
the effects of climate change, whether in designing 
buildings, planning civil engineering projects, or 
auditing accounts of a company exposed to climate-
related risks.  This type of potential for liability is of 
great significance not only to those directly at risk from 
                                                 
119 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
120 Id. at 400. 
121 Id. at 399. 
122 Id.  For a discussion of a similar civil law private wrong approach to climate change 
harms see Bartosz KuraĤ, Maciej Szewczyk, Dominik Waãkowski, Tomasz Wardyęski & 
Izabela Zielięska-Barãoİek, Poland, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 417, 
428–36. 
123 Silke Goldberg & Richard Lord QC, England, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 
35, at 445. 
124 Id. at 449 (footnote omitted). 
125 Id. at 458. 
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such actions, but to their investors, lenders, insurers and 
professional advisers.126 
English tort claims of negligence and nuisance might be filed in the 
future based on damages to property caused by sea level rise, extreme 
weather leading to property damage, and illnesses from warmer 
weather.127 
E. North America and South America National Laws128 
Canada has a federal system of government with a common law 
tradition of tort law outside of the civil law based province of Québec.129  
Interestingly, “[c]limate change has . . . emerged as the environmental 
issue in the eyes of the public in Canada over the past decade.  It has also 
become one of Canada’s great political, social and economic 
challenges.”130  Northern areas of Canada “are experiencing significant 
changes in temperature, precipitation and sea ice, which are affecting 
ecosystems and northern aboriginal populations in particular.”131  
Moreover, coastal areas risk damages from sea level rises, while western 
provinces face reduced precipitation; further climate change worries 
focus on forests, species, and agriculture.132  Canadian “[c]limate change 
tort litigation actions could be brought in negligence, conspiracy, strict 
liability, or public or private nuisance.”133 
The legal system in Brazil is based on civil law; as a federal system of 
government, the states share power with the federal government.134  
Brazilian climate change risks include “floods in large cities like Sáo 
Paulo [and] Rio de Janeiro among others; droughts in northern and 
southern Brazil, accompanied by . . . [animal mortality] and fires in the 
                                                 
126 Id. at 459. 
127 Id. at 460.  “Harm in terms of economic loss alone is less likely to be actionable.”  Id.  
For a review of Russian private law developments see Fiona Mucklow Cheremeteff, Max 
Gutbrod, Daria Ratsiborinskaya & Sergei Sitnikov, Russia, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, 
supra note 35, at 489, 512–17. 
128 For analysis of U.S. climate change private law matters see supra Part II. 
129 Meinhard Doelle, Dennis Mahony & Alex Smith, Canada, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 525–26. 
130 Id. at 525. 
131 Id. at 529. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).  For Mexican climate change private law liability issues 
see José Juan González Marquez, Mexico, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 
627, 637–42. 
134 Yanko Marcius De Alencar Xavier & Pedro Lucas De Moura Soares, Brazil, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 607. 
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midwest due to low air humidity” and warmer temperatures.135  
Uniquely, “[t]he basis for imposing civil liability on those causing 
environmental damage is found in Article 225, [Section] 3 of the 
Constitution.”136  Moreover, environmental civil liability under Brazilian 
law “arise[s] under Article 927 of the Brazilian Civil Code, which affirms 
the obligation to compensate damage regardless of fault when the 
activity that gives rise to the damage entails an inherent risk of harming 
others.”137 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Imagine a future climate change tort lawsuit, conceived and initiated 
by creative plaintiffs’ lawyers who boldly argue for the judicial 
recognition—in any country of the world discussed in this Article—of a 
“[n]ew [t]ort[]” cause of action for damages, injunctive relief for 
damages, and injunctive relief for personal or property damages.138  Of 
course, the “right” plaintiffs would be essential:  those who have 
suffered identifiable property damages or personal injuries fairly 
traceable to carbon-induced climate change.  Moreover, it would be 
optimal to sue manufacturers and electric utilities that clearly emit 
massive amounts of carbon, or other GHGs, into the atmosphere. 
Cobbling together comparative concepts from a number of tort 
precedents and doctrines from around the world, our intrepid lawyers 
might draw upon the following:  (1) the tort of public nuisance from state 
laws in the United States, focusing on the unreasonableness of the 
defendants’ massive emissions over long periods of time, the foreseeable 
risks of climate induced harm, and any efforts by the defendants to 
withhold information about climate change risks from their 
operations;139 (2) persuasive precedent of courts in nations that recognize 
constitutional rights to a healthy and balanced environment;140 (3) the 
principle of causation presumption, from Chinese environmental tort 
law, whereby the party causing the injury bears the burden of proving 
that there is no causality between the act causing the injury and the 
harmful results;141 (4) the rule of absolute liability, from Indian law, 
                                                 
135 Id. at 610. 
136 Id. at 615. 
137 Id. at 616. 
138 See Robert F. Blomquist, “New Torts”:  A Critical History, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95 
DICK. L. REV. 23 (1990) (discussing the public policy rationales of various American 
appellate courts for considering the legal recognition of new tort causes of action with new 
elements of a prima facie case). 
139 See supra Part II. 
140 See supra Part III.A. 
141 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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entailing a non-delegable duty owed to the community to ensure the 
highest standards of public safety when enterprises are involved in 
hazardous or inherently dangerous activities;142 (5) persuasive Japanese 
judicial precedent requiring industrial operations to shut down, without 
consideration of costs, when there exists a serious threat to life and 
body;143 (6) liberal negligence per se liability for climate change damages 
recognized under Israeli law based on violations of statutory and 
administrative requirements of industrial operations;144 (7) the evolving 
law of delict under South African law, providing flexibility for 
accommodating legal redress to new scenarios and threats of harm;145 
and (8) other assorted liberalizing trends, principles, and doctrine. 
                                                 
142 See supra notes 77 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
Blomquist: Comparative Climate Change Torts
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
